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Abstract 
Background 
The last decade has seen widespread retreat from user fees with the intention to reduce 
financial constraints to users in accessing health care and in particular improving access to 
reproductive, maternal and newborn health services. This has had important benefits in 
reducing financial barriers to access in a number of settings. If the policies work as intended, 
service utilization rates increase. However this increases workloads for health staff and at the 
same time, the loss of user fee revenues can imply that health workers lose bonuses or 
allowances, or that it becomes more difficult to ensure uninterrupted supplies of health care 
inputs. 
This research aimed to assess how policies reducing demand-side barriers to access to health 
care have affected service delivery with a particular focus on human resources for health. 
Methods 
We undertook case studies in five countries (Ghana, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe). In each we reviewed financing and HRH policies, considered the impact 
financing policy change had made on health service utilization rates, analysed the distribution 
of health staff and their actual and potential workloads, and compared remuneration terms in 
the public sectors. 
Results 
We question a number of common assumptions about the financing and human resource 
inter-relationships. The impact of fee removal on utilization levels is mostly not sustained or 
supported by all the evidence. Shortages of human resources for health at the national level 
are not universal; maldistribution within countries is the greater problem. Low salaries are not 
universal; most of the countries pay health workers well by national benchmarks. 
Conclusions 
The interconnectedness between user fee policy and HRH situations proves difficult to 
assess. Many policies have been changing over the relevant period, some clearly and others 
possibly in response to problems identified associated with financing policy change. Other 
relevant variables have also changed. 
However, as is now well-recognised in the user fee literature, co-ordination of health 
financing and human resource policies is essential. This appears less well recognised in the 
human resources literature. This coordination involves considering user charges, resource 
availability at health facility level, health worker pay, terms and conditions, and recruitment 
in tandem. All these policies need to be effectively monitored in their processes as well as 
outcomes, but sufficient data are not collected for this purpose. 
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Introduction 
Universal health coverage (UHC) has been labelled, ‘the most powerful unifying single 
concept that public health has to offer’, by Margaret Chan, Director of the World Health 
Organization [1]. 
UHC has become an international policy. In 2007, universal access to reproductive health 
was included among the Millennium Development Goals (MDG, goal 5b), which were 
unanimously agreed by all UN member states as part of the Millennium Declaration [2]. A 
UN resolution was passed by the UN General Assembly in December 2012, urging 
governments to ensure whole population access to affordable, quality, health services.a The 
primary initial focus of UHC policies has been on the extension of financial protection 
against health care costs through the provision of insurance and the removal of user fees at 
the point of use. 
Specific international attention to sexual and reproductive health has placed such services at 
the forefront of the UHC debate. A total of 179 nations committed to protect reproductive and 
health rights of women and girls at the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994, and this was reaffirmed at subsequent conferences in 
Beijing and Copenhagen. The High-Level Task Force for ICPD was established in 2012 to 
take forward this agenda in the period leading up to the twentieth anniversary of this 
commitment.b Inclusion of MDG goal 5b was owed to the momentum of these conferences 
[2]. Consequently, Reproductive Maternal and Newborn Health (RMNH) services have often 
been the first priority of the UHC policies of the different countries. 
With respect to removal of fees, this has amounted to a paradigm shift, with a growing 
consensus that user fees are regressive and undermine equitable access to essential health 
services [3], as do all types of out-of-pocket payment [4]. In particular, a concern that 
pregnant women and children under five years are negatively affected by such financial 
barriers has prompted many low- and middle-income countries to reconsider levying user 
charges by ensuring either more thorough implementation of exemption or waiver 
mechanisms, significant reduction in fee levels, or their abolition altogether [5,6]. While its 
impact on the level of out-of-pocket payments in the health system may not be definitive (and 
indeed, most health systems remain heavily dependent on out-of-pocket payments), such a 
policy shift [5] will undoubtedly have consequences for the health system across a number of 
dimensions, including the search for replacement revenue and ensuring quality in responding 
to the changes in utilization, reflecting increased numbers and patterns of utilization [3,8]. 
Both of these anticipated consequences raise specific concerns for human resources for health 
(HRH), yet this issue has been frequently overlooked until recently. Campbell et al. [5] 
suggest that demand-side support, ensuring that access is no longer constrained by payment 
for services, requires balance with support for the supply side in terms of capacity and quality 
of care. This research responds to this concern. 
The objective of this research was to determine the associations and inter-relationships 
between workforce characteristics (stock, distribution and competencies) and equitable access 
to RMNH services resulting from the removal of, or exemption from user fees. 
The research questions that we sought to answer were to understand the evidence of the 
impact of fees, exemptions and fee removal on HRH, and of HRH characteristics on the 
impact of fees, exemptions and fee removal. The sub-questions, to be addressed specifically 
in Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nepal and Ghana were: to describe the RMNH 
workforce in terms of its stock, distribution, skill mix, workload, remuneration and terms and 
conditions; to project need for RMNH workforce and identify plans in place to enhance 
quantitative and qualitative capacity; to describe the situation with respect to formal fees and 
exemptions, the revenue generated and its distribution, and effects on demand for health care; 
and to identify the policy implications. 
Background 
In the five case-study countries, there have been significant developments in both financing 
and human resources for health policy that have led to their selection as case studies and 
provide the background to the study. In Ghana, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zambia, the health 
system was designed during the mid-twentieth century or earlier to provide universal 
coverage through a public health-care system that is free at the point of use, financed largely 
through the government budget and mainly, therefore, through taxation and funds derived 
from development assistance. In the post-independence period, problems emerged to varying 
degrees, in sustaining accessible services at an adequate level of quality through this 
mechanism, and were generally attributed to funding shortfalls. User charges started to be 
introduced as early as 1969 in Ghana and as late as the early 1990s in Zambia. In Zimbabwe, 
fees existed at independence, but the exemption system effectively qualified most families for 
free health care until the mid-1990s when similar pressures emerged and user fees increased 
and became more widely applied. 
In Ghana, exemptions were introduced for delivery care in 2004, first in five regions, then 
across the country. The policy was later superseded in 2008 by free coverage of all pregnant 
women within the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). Both policies were 
undermined by poor availability of funds. Government HRH policy focused on task shifting 
and improving distribution, including introducing the deprived area incentive scheme, 
augmenting salaries in 55 districts. Large pay increases were funded in 2006 and in 2006 to 
2007 there was a significant expansion of training schools, although there were also some 
concerns about the effect of this expansion on quality of training. 
In Nepal, in principle, all citizens have free access to primary care. Targeted groups are also 
protected from secondary care costs. However, both policies have been undermined by 
shortfalls in funding. In 2005, financial incentives were introduced to encourage women to 
deliver in a facility, and in 2008 the Aama policy was introduced, providing free institutional 
deliveries in all public and some private facilities. The HRH strategy of 2003 aimed to 
increase the public sector workforce by 71% by 2017, with an emphasis on ensuring 
increased numbers of health workers with skilled birth attendance competencies. 
In Sierra Leone, the Free Health Care Policy (FHCP) was introduced in 2010, providing for 
free public care for pregnant women, lactating women and children under five years. 
Substantial salary increases were funded in 2011 and a performance-based financing system 
at district level was introduced in 2011. HRH policy planned incentives for hard-to-reach 
areas and reformed career paths and recruitment processes, although little progress had been 
made in these areas at the time of the research. 
In Zambia, user fees were abolished for rural primary care in 2006 and in peri-urban areas in 
2007 in both government and mission facilities. A Department for International Development 
(DFID) grant was provided to enable compensation for the resulting loss of revenue. HRH 
policies emphasized the training and recruitment of graduates, the development of a human 
resource (HR) information system, and the scaling up of the Zambia Health Workers 
Retention Scheme, offering salary top-ups in remote areas. 
In Zimbabwe, there was a policy of free care but it had been inconsistently applied, and there 
was a perception that charging could be locally determined. HRH expenditure collapsed to 
0.3% of the public health budget in 2008. Dollarization of the economy may have improved 
the position of health workers since then, and also increased the real value of those fees that 
are charged. An Emergency Retention Scheme was introduced, supporting salaries of key 
professional cadres, but this will be phased out by 2013. The HRH strategic plan identified 
the key priority of staff retention. 
Methods 
This study consisted of the following components: literature review, desk-based analysis and 
document review, field studies and analysis. No experimental research or research on humans 
was involved in this work. 
Literature review 
We undertook a review of the current literature on the removal of, exemption from or waivers 
of user fees in low- and middle-income countries in relation to RMNH and the consequences 
for human resources for health working in RMNH. First, to be included, studies had to 
address either the removal of user charges or the application of exemptions and/or waivers in 
order to facilitate access to RMNH services in low- and middle-income countries. The user 
fee, exemption and waiver mechanisms at national, provincial and district level were 
explored. The second criterion for inclusion was consideration of the effect of these financing 
instruments on RMNH health personnel, particularly cadres of skilled birth attendants 
(SBAs), including nurses, midwives, doctors and clinical officers and the paramedical, 
support and ancillary staff. 
The final criterion was publication date, which was restricted to 2001 to 2011, with some 
exceptions, where studies on the introduction of user fees from the 1980s to 1990s were 
included for historical context. Only studies and reports written in the English language were 
collected, collated and consolidated in the bibliography. The following databases and sources 
were searched: PubMed, Popline, SCOPUS, Science Direct, Web of Knowledge, Human 
Resources for Health Journal, Equinet, MNCH knowledge portal, ELDIS, HRH Global 
Resource Centre, World Health Organization, Alliance for Health Policy and Health Systems 
Research, and Google Scholar, using a list of 66 key words. 
In the initial search, 500 articles were identified, out of which 267 were shortlisted based on 
the keywords above; the abstracts were then reviewed independently by two researchers and 
115 were shortlisted. Following a further refinement of the search parameters, in which the 
keywords were narrowed to exclude any articles not including reference to human resources 
engaged with RMNH activity, a final list of 67 was included and the full articles were 
included and reviewed. Similarly, the grey literature search furnished 200 documents and 35 
were included following the aforesaid procedure. 
Desk-based data analysis and document review 
We sought data on: 
• Human resource numbers and distribution (by cadre and district) in public and private 
sectors and before and after the financing policy change of interest, where relevant; 
• Public and private sector remuneration and allowances, and trends; 
• RNMH need as measured by the population and birth rate by district; 
• Health-management information-system data on levels of use of antenatal care, postnatal 
care, deliveries, newborn care, abortions, and family planning, gynaecological, sexually 
transmitted diseases (STD) and HIV clinic services. 
Access to data sets held by Ministries of Health, Central Statistical Offices and similar offices 
was secured along with policy and planning documents, through the recruitment of local 
collaborators in a position to access these. Grey literature was located by web search and by 
contacting relevant local agencies. The search for data and documents was undertaken during 
2011. 
Much of the data sought proved unavailable. Trend data were generally unavailable either 
due to an absence of maintenance of a historic database, or because previous estimates of 
variables were made in a way not comparable with those of present estimates. Private sector 
data were difficult to access and sparse where available at all. 
Field studies 
Field studies were undertaken in two countries (Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe) to gain more in-
depth understanding in both HRH and financing domains. These countries were selected 
because there was a smaller literature base on user fees and their removal, in these countries 
than in others. In Sierra Leone, the time was spent accessing documents and secondary data 
and seeking clarifications in relation to data that appeared inconsistent. Data quality was 
poor, and there remain considerable gaps in what we were able to collect. 
Analysis 
In each country we analysed available data and research reports to review: (1) how financing 
policy change had affected utilization levels; (2) the geographical distribution of the health 
workforce; (3) delivery workloads and how actual workloads and potential workloads (based 
on the total number of births that are estimated for the country) compared to what is 
considered by the WHO to be a feasible workload; and (4) remuneration and terms and 
conditions. In the discussion section, we address to what extent a review of these data help to 
answer our research questions concerning the inter-relationships between workforce and 
financing situations and policies. 
Qualitative data were transcribed and analysed thematically, starting from the topics outlined 
in the interview guides, but allowing for identification of new themes arising from the 
discussions. Analysis of the distribution of the health workforce in each country computed 
concentration indices (CIs). These are constructed by ordering districts by increasing 
population density (from most sparsely to most densely populated districts) and measuring 
the distance between actual and equal shares of health workers per head of population in each 
district. A hypothetical situation where health workers are distributed equally in proportion to 
population across the country produces a CI of zero (no distance from actual to equal share). 
In a situation where the distribution favours densely populated areas, the index will be greater 
than zero. Maximum, pro-urban, concentration is where the whole of the staff is based in the 
most densely populated district and the corresponding CI is one. 
Literature review 
In the mid-1980s, many low- and middle-income countries were encouraged to introduce user 
fees as a response to declining national health budgets. User fees were presented as a means 
of cost recovery of public health expenditure, as well as enhancing efficiency and equity 
[3,7]. The Bamako Initiative, put into action by African Ministers of Health, followed on 
closely in 1987. It included user fees among its instruments, amid assertions that it would 
produce quality improvements in services through the local retention of generated revenue. It 
also placed a strong emphasis on community participation [7,8]. 
However, after more than two decades of global user-fee experience, these objectives have 
been rigorously critiqued [9-11]. As the regressive nature of user fees has come under close 
scrutiny [3,9,12] many countries have taken steps to either reduce or abolish user fees in their 
health facilities, or to more consistently apply exemptions or waivers from fees for specific 
groups or services [13-15]. 
The slow progress in reducing the high levels of maternal and neonatal deaths in low income 
countries has led to a renewed commitment to improve provision and access to RMNH 
services [3]. At least three quarters of neonatal deaths and a similar proportion of maternal 
deaths occur outside hospital [16]. User fees are cited as a considerable financial barrier to 
women’s care-seeking during and following their pregnancy [17,18]. A long list of countries 
including Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, 
Nepal, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia have pursued fee removal 
or exemption policies for delivery care and/or caesarean section [6]. Most studies reviewing 
utilization following the abolition of user charges for deliveries and other related maternity 
care have observed a rise in assisted deliveries and caesarean sections at health facilities 
[3,13,18-25] and, in some cases, show that gains are concentrated in poorer groups [7,14]. 
Campbell et al. [5], however, present another perspective in acknowledging the challenges 
now presented by fee removal: 
What is the net benefit of increasing access to ‘free’ health services if there is 
no qualified health worker available to provide care, or where you may queue 
all day only to be afforded an ineffectual consultation which undermines 
respect, trust, privacy and confidentiality? Such are the realities in many low-
income countries, particularly in rural and remote areas, where health workers 
are drastically in short supply, and often over-burdened and ⁄ or under-
resourced (p.1) 
Lee et al. [17] concur, arguing that, ‘strategies to increase demand for services need to be 
accompanied by actions to ensure the supply side can cope with the increased demand 
(p.114). 
Recent reviews of the growing trend to abolish or suspend user fees highlight that for these 
policies to be effective, careful planning of the supply-side response to the stimulated demand 
has to take place [7,9,13,23,24,26,27]. 
The literature generally underplays the important contribution of fee revenue at facility level 
[27]. In Senegal, for example, at the higher levels of the system, user fees made up 37% of 
the revenue of the regional hospital and 43% of the Centres de Santé, whereas the health 
posts derived 95 to 96% of their revenues from user fees [21]. In situations where fee revenue 
was retained by the district or sub-district facility, it also allowed some autonomy and 
flexibility for the district health management team or the health centre in charge to respond to 
gaps in funding [28]. Such discretionary funding would often supplement low salaries, cover 
delays in receiving salaries or cover the costs of community or support staff [21,24,28-30]. 
Several studies, for example, Kipp et al. [31], also describe the important role such incentives 
had on staff motivation. Often, technical and community support staff received wages or 
small bonuses from user-fee revenues in Afghanistan [28], Uganda [32] Zambia [29] and 
Senegal [21]. 
Increases in utilization lead to increases in staff workloads if there is no additional 
recruitment. In several countries this was anticipated with a concomitant rise in salary; in 
other countries a lack of preparation and planning compounded the problem of staff shortages 
and difficulties with rural allocation and retention, leading to significantly low morale. 
Most studies reported that health staff considered their workload to have increased since the 
new policies on fee removal or exemptions commenced [13,19,24,28,33,34]. Witter et al. 
[21] report similar increases (of about one third) in delivery workloads for midwives in 
Senegal and medical assistants in Ghana [18,22]. Concomitant with increased workload, 
various studies report declining morale - in Burundi [33], South Africa [190], and Uganda 
[24] - made worse where allowances or bonuses are also removed, as in Zambia [29]. In both 
Zambia [29,35] and Uganda [36-38] additional funding was released by the Ministries of 
Health to the districts to compensate for loss of revenue. In Uganda, according to Nabyonga-
Orem et al. [36], flexibility in how these funds were to be used was allowed, although 
Ssengooba et al. [30] suggest that the additional funds did not directly compensate staff. In 
Zambia, few guidelines were provided by the Ministry of Health about what the ‘user fee 
replacement grants’ could be used for [29], decisions about their use were centralized and 
distribution did not reflect the former levels of user-fee collection [39]. 
Loss of financial autonomy provided by user fees has been regretted in a number of countries, 
including Burundi. Before the introduction in 2006 of free health services for children under 
five years and free deliveries, hospitals retained all user fees and were expected to be 
relatively self sufficient [33]. Following the abolition of fees for these services, delays in 
reimbursement affected hospital and health-centre functioning, as they now could not pay for 
their own supplies. In Burkina Faso, the 20% bonus formerly received by RMNH staff for 
deliveries from the user fee was retained but with no guidance on how to calculate from 
which price they should take the 20% [13,26]. 
In Nepal and Burkina Faso, reimbursement tariffs were decided centrally by the Ministry of 
Health. Nepal’s national free delivery policy has retained incentive payments to health 
workers of the earlier scheme [14]. The tariffs in Nepal varied according to facility type and 
degree of obstetric complication [15]. In Niger, the additional administrative and clinical 
workload experienced by health workers, and created by increased utilization, was 
acknowledged, and a payment of a monthly bonus supplemented their salary [40]. 
Community and support staff often had to be made redundant once facilities no longer had 
discretionary funds from fee revenue. This occurred in Uganda [32]. Some of the staff of the 
Centres de Santé community in Senegal received a fixed monthly allowance [21]. 
Very few studies identified the cadres affected by fee removal or exemptions. Witter et al. 
[21] cite a shortage of midwives in Senegal. The workforce associated with delivery care in 
Nepal remained stable or increased, but increases were not directly related to financing policy 
[14] (p.89). 
While Hoope-Bender et al. [41] argue that, ‘most primary health care frontline workers are 
not sufficiently skilled to deliver a minimum MNH service package (p. 230), others are 
more hopeful that a process of careful planning for task shifting could produce sufficient 
skills in lower cadres to meet the need, including performing caesarean sections [42]. 
Case studies 
How financing policy change affected utilization levels 
In Ghana, the delivery exemption policy appeared to be effective in raising utilization with 
some modest equity gains [18]. One study has compared baseline data in two districts, before 
the NHIS (in 2004) and after (in 2007) [43]. Its findings suggest that there has been an 
increase in access to formal care amongst members, as well as a significant decrease in out-
of-pocket expenditure. However, there was no difference in use of maternal care (antenatal 
care (ANC), deliveries or caesarean sections) between the intervention and control group. 
While there is no public information on trends in use of outpatient services by insured 
patients specifically, outpatient use for the population as a whole shows a marked increase 
from 2005 onward, compared to stable (low) use before. The timing and pattern correlated 
with growth in NHIS membership, indicating that the NHIS has indeed increased service use 
[44]. According to an International Labour Organization (ILO) paper of 2006, ‘utilization for 
the insured was then at around 0.9 (OPD [out patients] per capita - almost twice the non-
insured (then at 0.49 visits per capita)’ [44]. However, even the rate for the insured falls far 
below the Service Availability and Readiness Assessment (SARA)c benchmark level of 5 
[46]. It is also interesting to note that overall admissions have not experienced consistent 
growth between 2005 and 2008. This might reflect the benefits of early intervention through 
better access to outpatient care. 
In Nepal, the latest household survey on the Aama programme [47] indicates that over the 
past five years, there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of women giving birth 
in a health facility (albeit from very low levels). In high Human Development Index (HDI) 
districts, the rate of institutional delivery care has increased from 33 to 54% and in low HDI 
districts from 6 to 21% between 2005 and 2010. 
There was some evidence of pro-poor impact of fee exemption: three low-HDI districts saw 
higher rates of free-facility births than three high-HDI districts, and in the low-HDI districts, 
poorer women were more likely to receive free care. Trends over time by wealth group show 
that inequality in facility births has fallen substantially and marginalized castes have seen 
large increases in utilization over the past five years. 
In Sierra Leone, the impact of the FHCP on utilization appears mixed [48]. For outpatient 
visits of children under five years, there was a more than twofold increase in the number of 
consultations in the twelve months post-FHCP introduction compared to the last year before 
the FHCP. However, this conceals a gradual downward trend in the later part of the first year 
post-FHCP, and even after the increase there were fewer than 0.5 consultations per member 
of the population per year. Liaqat and Ferry [49] confirm that there was a sharp and 
statistically significant increase in health utilization by children under five years across 
Bombali District immediately after the introduction of the FHCP, but the peak was not 
sustained. In the immunization of children under age one, 88% of children were fully 
immunized pre-FHCP but this had fallen to 76% post-FHCP [48]. 
In maternal health, there was an increase of 45% in the number of pregnant women making at 
least one ANC visit. There was an initial increase in the number of postnatal care (PNC) 
consultations, but a slight reduction towards the end of the first year. The number of new 
acceptors of modern family-planning methods increased by about 140% in the first 12 
months of the FHCP [50]. Again, these percentage increases must be understood in the 
context of very low initial levels of service use. 
In Zambia, after free care was introduced in 2006, an analysis of facility records from the 
Health Management Information System (HMIS) showed that removing user fees for primary 
health care services increased the number of outpatient visits in rural districts by patients over 
five years of age, and achieved visit-per-capita rates of two in rural districts, well above the 
African and urban Zambian average, if still far below SARAd benchmarks [35,45]. However, 
there was a wide difference across districts, ranging from a fall of 39% to an increase of more 
than 100% [51]. The increase in utilization was not always sustained over time and there was 
indication of crowding-out of children under five years, who already received care free of 
charge before the policy change. Analysis of a comprehensive national facility-based dataset 
found that utilization increased by 55% among the rural population aged at least five years. 
Utilization increases were greatest in the districts with the highest levels of poverty and 
material deprivation [35], although this analysis regressed percentage utilization change with 
district deprivation score, and may have been confounded by an underlying correlation of 
initial utilization levels and deprivation. However, analysis of the Living Conditions 
Measurement Surveys (LCMS) did not confirm an increase in access to care. The analysis 
found no evidence that removing fees improved the probability to seek care when falling ill, 
even after adjusting for the varying degree of implementation of the policy across districts 
[51]. 
In Zimbabwe, there is a lack of clarity about the levels of fees that should apply, and have, in 
practice, applied over recent decades. This implies that analyses of utilization trends cannot 
be linked effectively to discrete changes in policy and implementation. However, there is 
evidence that fees act as a deterrent to use of health care [50]. 
In the interviews we conducted, delivery care in facilities was viewed as difficult to afford for 
most families, even in the absence of complications. This is likely to be one factor behind the 
high rate of home deliveries, even though these are discouraged (and as a result, traditional 
birth attendants (TBAs) were nervous about speaking about their work), and despite the fact 
that families have to bring newborn babies into health facilities to get a birth record [52]. 
The geographical distribution of the health workforce 
WHO defines an SBA as, 
… an accredited health professional – such as a midwife, doctor or nurse – 
who has been educated and trained to proficiency in the skills needed to 
manage normal (uncomplicated) pregnancies, childbirth and the immediate 
postnatal period, and in the identification, management and referral of 
complications in women and newbornse 
While this definition is clear in principle, it is not always easy to operationalize in any given 
context. Some categories of staff in use include those who have and have not been educated 
in this set of competencies. For example, some nurses may have undertaken specialist 
childbirth-related training and some not. Furthermore, those whose training has included 
these competencies may not have undertaken relevant practice in the meantime, or may not 
have retained them for other reasons. The categories of staff, at least some of whom have 
SBA capacities in the five countries, can be listed as doctors, nurses, midwives (not a 
separate category from nurses in Nepal and Zimbabwe), clinical officers (Zambia and 
Zimbabwe only), and auxiliary nurse midwives (Nepal only). 
We were able to disaggregate data for public and private sectors in Ghana, Nepal and Sierra 
Leone, and further separate non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and faith-based 
organizations (FBOs) from the rest of the private sector in Sierra Leone. These data show that 
in Ghana, most health professionals work in the public sector, namely, 80% of doctors, 80% 
of midwives and 91% of nurses. In Nepal the situation is almost reversed: 83% of doctors, 
59% of nurses and 33% of auxiliary nurse midwives work in the private sector. In Sierra 
Leone, 58% of doctors, 62% of nurses and 66% of midwives work in the public sector while 
15% of doctors, 16% of nurses and 16% of midwives work in FBOs. The remainder work in 
the for-profit sector. In Zambia it is reported elsewhere that 80% of health workers worked in 
the public sector in 2006 [53] and in Zimbabwe, it has been estimated that 45% of doctors 
work full-time in the private sector [54]. 
In Zambia, data were available for two time periods, 2004 and 2010. It was not possible to 
obtain data for more than one time period in any other country. Figure 1 shows the 
comparative CIs for the five countries, computed in this manner. 
Figure 1 Concentration indices: health workers by cadre, latest available dates. 
The figure shows that in all countries but Sierra Leone, doctors are much more concentrated 
in densely populated (urban) areas than other cadres. In Sierra Leone, nurses and midwives 
are about equally concentrated in those areas, and no cadre provides cover for remoter rural 
areas. Overall, the concentration of doctors in urban areas is most pronounced in Nepal. 
Clinical officers in Zambia and Auxiliary Nurse Midwives (ANMs) in Nepal are spread 
almost equally across areas, in line with population numbers, suggesting the significant 
potential for such additional, non-traditional cadres to contribute to more equitable population 
coverage for RMNH services. However, in Zimbabwe it is nurse/midwives who make the 
most contribution to providing RMNH services in remoter rural areas. The number of clinical 
officers is very small and most of them are in Harare. Figure 2 compares public and private 
sector CIs for those countries for which that disaggregation was possible. 
Figure 2 Concentration indices in public and private sectors. 
The figure shows that, according to those HRH data available, Nepal achieves fairly equitable 
distribution of health workers in its public sector: its high overall CIs (Figure 2) reflect the 
dominance of the private sector in the employment of health workers. In Ghana and Nepal, 
the private sector employs health workers predominantly in urban areas resulting in CIs 
considerably higher than for the public sector. The further disaggregation in Sierra Leone 
between NGO/FBO and other private sectors shows the importance of this distinction. In 
Sierra Leone, health workers in the NGO/FBO sector are most equitably distributed. 
Nevertheless, they are still highly concentrated in urban areas - more so than staff in the 
public sectors of Ghana and Nepal. 
Delivery workloads 
Table 1 shows the workload in terms of the current numbers of deliveries per SBA and per 
doctor, and the number of births per SBA and per doctor in each country as a whole. This 
shows the actual workload, if evenly distributed among all health workers in the country and 
the full coverage workload, if all deliveries were attended by an SBA in a facility. In Zambia, 
the definition of an SBA is particularly difficult and we show these totals for both a ‘narrow’ 
and a ‘broad’ definitione. 
Table 1 Delivery workload for skilled birth attendants and doctors: actual rate of 
facility-based deliveries and full coverage (all births) 
 Births per 
SBA 
Births per doctor Attended deliveries 
per SBA 
Attended deliveries 
per doctor 
Ghana 2010/11 29 283 13 127 
Nepal 2011 309 525 132 224 
Sierra Leone 1202 1048 320 279 
Zambia, narrow 185 1317 73 515 
Zambia, broad 133 52 
Zimbabwe 18 475 12 313 
SBA, skilled birth attendant. 
The WHO suggests that one doctor is required for around 1000 birthsf, to provide emergency 
intervention where there are complications before, during and after delivery, whereas a 
midwife can provide care for 175 births per year. On the basis of these assumptions, most 
countries do not have an absolute shortage of health workers relative to current levels of 
facility-based delivery, with the exception of Sierra Leone. This is not surprising, as the 
availability of health staff and the quality-of-care problems that can result from excess 
demand for their services, serve to constrain demand. In Sierra Leone, births with ANMs, 
Community Health Officers (CHOs) and nurses, as well as midwives and doctors, are 
counted as attended births although ANMs, CHOs and nurses do not meet the training 
requirements to be classified as SBAs [55]. Ghana and Zimbabwe even have sufficient staff 
to provide full coverage for facility-based SBAs. Other countries have some shortfalls in 
relation to ability to provide full coverage. Clearly, this includes Sierra Leone, which does 
not have sufficient staff to cope even with the current workload. Zambia does not have a 
sufficient number of doctors, nor marginally, skilled birth attendants, under the narrow 
definition. Nepal has sufficient doctors for full coverage but not SBAs. 
However, the dominant problem restricting access to skilled birth attendance in a facility is 
distribution: both geographic distribution and distribution among the public and private 
sectors. In Ghana, all regions have sufficient SBAs and doctors to provide full coverage, 
although this may not be true at district level. The situation is similar in Zimbabwe for SBAs, 
although regional numbers suggest that most districts are likely to have sufficient SBAs to 
cope, even with full coverage. This is not the case for Zimbabwe, where doctors are 
insufficient to cover actual current workload in four out of ten regions, or to provide full 
coverage in seven out of ten regions. This compares to no more than 120 births and 100 
deliveries per doctor in Harare and Bulawayo [51]. In Nepal, only two of five regions (the 
Central and Western Development Regions) have sufficient doctors for either current 
workload or full coverage, and whereas all regions have sufficient ANMs for the current 
workload, none have sufficient for full coverage. At the extreme, the Far Western 
Development Region has one doctor for every 7562 births and one ANM for every 517 
births. Nearly all districts in Sierra Leone have insufficient staff to cope with current 
workload. At the extreme, Kailahun District has one midwife for every 17 415 births and one 
midwife for every 4627 current facility deliveries, explaining the use of under-skilled staff to 
play this role. In Zambia, 55 districts (76%) have insufficient doctors to provide coverage at a 
rate of one for every 1000 births; 13 (18%) have no doctors at all. In 36 districts (50%) there 
is insufficient staff for full coverage under the narrow definition of SBA and 8 districts (11%) 
have insufficient staff for actual levels of facility-based delivery under the broad definition. 
We were able to break down staff and workload numbers by district and public and private 
sectors in Sierra Leone. Of our five case studies, Sierra Leone has some of the most extreme 
RMNH staff shortages according to the above analysis. The numbers cited above for 
Kailahun are unaffected by the public-private disaggregation, as there is no private sector of 
either type there. This is likely to apply in other contexts: those districts that are most under-
served in general are those in which private sector presence is likely to be least. A better 
served district such as Western Area has a relatively manageable 119 actual deliveries per 
midwife. Excluding sources of private-sector care that number rises to 175, on the cusp of 
what is considered manageable and indicating that even Western region would require more 
public sector midwives to provide adequately skilled care to an increasing rate of utilization 
of SBAs in public facilities. 
Remuneration and terms and conditions 
It is very difficult to compare terms and conditions. There are variations in entry-level 
qualifications required, length of training and other barriers to entry to the health professions, 
and some of the case studies show these to be in flux as attempts are made to cope with 
shortages by reducing such barriers. Conditions that are important to health workers cannot 
all be captured as a national-level phenomenon: the quality and security of accommodation 
available; the working conditions, including presence of utilities and availability of basic 
supplies to support effective work; and the sanitary and other infection prevention conditions 
cannot be effectively compared and summarized across countries. 
We have attempted to compare public sector salaries for the main health professions involved 
in RMNH. This is complex for several reasons. First, health professions are defined slightly 
differently. For example, we have used the term, doctor, but attempted to capture the ranges 
of pay and allowances that apply to a health professional with a medical degree, operating as 
a general primary provider, excluding specialists operating at tertiary level from our 
calculations. However, pay scales often overlap between longer-serving general doctors and 
more junior specialists and an approximate cut-off was used in some cases. Enrolled and 
registered nurses are still separated categories in some countries (among our case studies, 
Sierra Leone). As previously discussed, midwives are not a separate category in all countries. 
Second, comparisons of different currencies can be made in terms of purchasing-power 
parity. However estimates of the rate of translation of a currency to its international dollar 
value are not made continuously. Currently, the best available estimates are from 2009. For 
Zimbabwe, these relate to the pre-dollarized economy and cannot be used for our purposes. 
Zimbabwean estimates are consequently presented in US dollars. 
Third, we are interested in the relative, as well as the absolute value of salaries. We have 
compared salary levels to measures of national income or national product per capita as a 
measure of this. However, income distributions may differ and good-quality data on income 
distribution in Africa are scarce. If health workers benchmark their standards of living against 
others within their society they deem professionally comparable, our analysis is unable to 
indicate what this comparison may indicate. 
Table 2 shows the public-sector pay (salary midpoints) of health workers in international 
dollarsg and as a ratio to gross national income (GNI) per capita for the countryh. In 
Zimbabwe the figures are for US dollars and gross domestic product (GDP) at current 
exchange rates.i 
Table 2 Public sector remuneration (salary midpoints incorporating allowances) in 
international dollars and as a ratio to GNI per capita (all current: December 2011) 
 Value of salary and allowances in 
international dollars 
Salary expressed as ratio to per capita gross 
national income 
 Doctora Nurse Midwife Doctor Nurse Midwife 
Ghana 3932 2171 2171 28.4 15.7 15.7 
Nepal 4408 3851  43.7 38.2  
Sierra Leone 3179 429c 578d 46.0 6.2c 8.4d 
Zambia 5346 2167  46.5 18.4  
Zimbabweb 218 176  4.4 3.6  
aGeneral medical doctor or closest equivalent available; bZimbabwe estimates are expressed in US 
dollars and as a ratio to per capita gross domestic product at current exchange rates; cstate-enrolled 
nurse; dstate-registered nurse and community midwife. 
The data suggest that complaints about poor pay for most cadres in most countries would be 
unjustified, and in all cases health workers earn well above average rates of earning in their 
communities. Doctors in all countries but Zimbabwe appear to be among a rich elite earning 
28- to 46-fold the average income. Nurses in Ghana, Nepal and Zambia are nearly as well 
paid, in the range of 15- to 38-fold. The recent pay award in Sierra Leone puts Sierra 
Leonean doctors into the same category, but leaves Sierra Leonean enrolled and registered 
nurses and midwives much less well paid. Zimbabwean health workers are more modestly 
paid than their counterparts in the other four countries. In those countries in which high 
salaries apply, reform of salary scales has been among the recent HRH policy innovations, 
suggesting a trend that other countries, and at least Zimbabwe among our case study 
countries, may have little choice but to follow. 
As suggested above, the comparison with per capita GNP or GDP does not enable assessment 
of the relative remuneration in the sectors that health workers may deem comparable. It is 
difficult to obtain data for the top end of income distributions in African countries. Survey 
data are subject to large errors because of the small population earning at high levels and 
probable biases in the self-reporting of income among this population. The Zambia Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey of 2004, for example, uses a cut-off of ZK 800 000 
(approximately US$ 150 at current exchange rates) per month as its upper income threshold. 
Eighteen percent of Zambians stated an income of this level or above in 2004 and no further 
breakdowns of this figure are available. Doctors’ incomes have been estimated at more than 
10-fold this cut-off, and nurses’ incomes at 3- to 4-fold. 
Another possibility is that comparisons are not made locally but with international salary 
benchmarks. Given the increasing international mobility of health workers, it may be 
considered by governments setting salaries that health workers can only be retained if 
international salary levels can be matched. However, salaries so out of touch with the national 
economic capacity raise significant questions of sustainability, not only in a long-term future 
in which aid dependency is reduced, but also in an aid-supported future in which health 
worker numbers are significantly higher. 
Discussion 
This study relied on secondary data and is constrained by the limited extent of those data. In 
particular, there were very few historic data that we were able to access, and we were 
generally unable to compare the situation of the health workforce before and after financing-
policy change. Secondary data are also affected by well-known quality concerns that in the 
cases of individual datasets are difficult to assess. We benefited, however, from recent 
initiatives to strengthen HRH databases in several of the countries. Despite constraints in the 
data collection process, we believe the data we have used were the most up-to-date at the 
time of collection (2011) and those believed the best quality available in each country. 
Of the four case-study countries that have removed or introduced exemptions for user fees for 
RMNH (in the fifth case-study country, Zimbabwe, no discrete policy change was 
introduced), only in Nepal is there clear evidence of positive impact on utilization without 
significant exception. In Ghana, better evidence is available in relation to the earlier maternal 
health exemption programme than the more recent inclusion of free maternal health services 
in the NHIS, although an evaluation of the NHIS exemption for pregnant women was due in 
2012, according to Ministry of Health sources. It appears clear that utilization increased 
where free care was effectively available, but implementation difficulties, most notably 
under-funding of the programme, implied that effective free care (at least as judged by users) 
was not sustained, with the implication that higher rates of utilization also could not be 
sustained. In Zambia, fee removal was not specifically targeted at Maternal and Newborn 
Child Health (MNCH) services and there is conflicting evidence of the impact of fee removal 
on utilization. In Sierra Leone, data suggest an initial increase in outpatient visits for children 
under five years in the first year of the policy, but a gradual decline since then, and an overall 
fall in immunization levels, which may have been caused by factors external to the policy. 
These findings illustrate the importance of attending to the supply side, including human 
resource constraints, when seeking to support access to effective health care through 
financing policy change. 
In Nepal and Zambia, there is some evidence that user-fee removal has particularly enhanced 
the utilization of poorer groups (Nepal) or areas (Zambia), although we have expressed some 
doubt about the Zambian analysis on this point. In other countries, it has not been possible to 
break down utilization change in this way. 
The HRH situation in case-study countries is more variable than might have been expected. 
At national level, shortages of HR relative to the needs of RMNH services are not universal. 
However, in general, there are local shortages relative to need, either because of overall 
national level shortages, which are acute in Sierra Leone and more marginal in Zimbabwe, or 
because maldistribution creates local shortage where there is national sufficiency. The 
relative contribution of health workers in the private sector is difficult to measure. Although 
such workers represent capacity to deal with RMNH needs, they may be under-used to the 
extent that people are unable to access those health workers due to the financial barrier. In 
Nepal where the proportion of health staff in the private sector is highest, this issue is more 
important than it yet is in the African countries. However, economic and private sector 
growth in these countries implies that questions of access to private-sector health staff and 
their influence on the overall balance of need and HRH capacity will require a more 
sophisticated analysis. 
Low salaries are not the general situation of health workers in the case-study countries, with 
salary levels for doctors in Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zambia, implying that they must be 
located at least in the top 2% of the income distribution, and in Ghana, the top 3 to 4%j. Other 
cadres, other than nurses in Nepal, are not quite so well paid. The situation in Sierra Leone 
for non-doctor health workers and for all health workers in Zimbabwe is more moderate, with 
pay levels at 3- to 9-fold per capita GNI/GDP. 
The relatively high salary levels for at least some health workers suggest that their market 
position or collective bargaining power is strong. One explanation of this is the greatly 
increased level of international migration since the 1990s. This implies a global market for 
scarce medical skills in which some countries seem positioned to compete, although the 
sustainability of that level of competition is questionable both in the medium and long terms. 
Benchmarks are not available and the expectations of well-educated Africans and Asians, 
whose economies are characterized by high degrees of inequity in income distribution, are 
likely to be relatively high in comparison to national incomes per capita than in countries 
where education is less scarce. Given that only 2% of Zambians (for example, Zambia Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey, 2004) are educated to degree level or above, it may be a 
reasonable expectation of those who are, that their incomes should locate them in the same 
elite. 
Another key issue is the extent to which competence in skilled birth attendance is difficult to 
assess across the case-study countries. The research has relied on rules of thumb about who 
counts or does not count as an SBA. There are particular difficulties in this assessment in 
Zambia, where no separate category of midwife exists and where nurses are not all trained to 
an adequate level of competence in skilled birth attendance; and in Sierra Leone where 
Maternal Child Health (MCH) aides do not meet the international definition of SBA but are 
locally expected to play this role. Even health workers who have initially been provided with 
sufficient training but who are not highly motivated, have not subsequently practised in the 
role of SBA, or have not received sufficient in-service training since, will not in practice have 
the requisite level of skill. Hence, the capacity to scale up to 95% coverage of RMNH 
services is probably more limited than it appears. 
This research highlights gaps in systematic and well planned coordination between financing 
policy and HR policy. In our case-study countries, there have been laudable attempts to plan 
for the impact of fee removal or reduction, and sometimes concomitant supportive change, 
even if not specifically responding to the needs of financing-policy change. The global 
literature review suggests that poor coordination is widespread. In some cases, such as in 
Niger and Zambia, measures were taken after problems associated with the removal of fees 
became evident. In the case of Zambia, of which we know more, the measures of 
compensation appeared to come too little and too late, sometimes not at all. 
A number of countries that removed fees also increased health worker pay to some extent at 
around the same time, although it is not clear that this was directly in compensation of 
changes brought about by fees in all cases. In Sierra Leone, the two policy debates have been 
clearly linked and salaries were increased in preparation for the FHCP [57]. Such explicit 
linkage is not apparent in the other countries. In Zambia it is claimed that the user-fee 
removal policy came with no plan or budget to recruit and deploy health workers [56]. 
Rather like pay, in some cases additional recruitment was undertaken concurrent to fee 
reform, but it is not clear in Zambia or Ghana that this was carefully planned as part of a 
package of complementary policies. In contrast, Sierra Leone did plan increased recruitment 
as an element of the FHCP and this had been ‘partially achieved’ at the time of a review in 
June 2010 in the sense that it was seen as contingent on the salary uplift. 
Rather it appears that pay reform, recruitment activity and user-fee reform are among a 
plethora of interventions that are being introduced concurrently but with insufficient 
coordination. The literature on user fees is now quite clear on the need for associated 
measures, and the implications of the neglect of these are clear. In the first place, failure to 
coordinate undermines the impact of user-fee reform through what appear as implementation 
problems and result in the failure of policies to secure expected results or to sustain them. In 
the second place, user-fee reform may be exacerbating HR problems. The clearest case of this 
is the Zambian one. Ironically, the focus of user-fee removal on rural districts, intended to 
target access improvements in rural areas, has had a disproportionate effect on workloads in 
rural areas, which were already significantly greater than in urban areas. Worsening the 
relative conditions in rural areas is likely, other things being equal, to worsen the 
maldistribution of HRH and may result in rural access deteriorating. In Sierra Leone, loss of 
user-fee income has resulted in the loss of volunteer workers, who in practice depended on 
user fees for an income rather than constituting volunteers in the strict sense. This may 
explain the declining rate of immunization, as this appears to depend to some extent on such 
workers. 
The difficulties of policy coordination are well-known and are not confined to low- and 
middle-income settings [57]. The specific set of policy process issues involved in user-fee 
removal have been analysed by Meessen et al. [58], who find that what they describe as 
‘good practice’ has more often than not been absent in the six African countries they review. 
One common feature they identify is a ‘top-down’ and in many cases sudden and surprise 
move to remove charges that planners and policy makers at lower levels then struggle to 
adjust to. This may partly explain some of the problems in our case-study countries too. 
The HRH situation also affects user-fee reform in the sense that there is some evidence 
among our case studies that staff who feel aggrieved because of a sense of overwork, 
underpay or deterioration in conditions, are more likely to undermine user-fee reform in the 
interests of maintaining the status quo. In all countries, there was evidence that services 
intended to be free were not always experienced as such by users, although to different 
extents. This problem was seen to be small in Sierra Leone, and to have reduced in Nepal, but 
indicates a clear link between the two areas of policy in this direction. At the extreme, 
informal fees can simply replace formal ones. 
Linkage also operates in both directions through the medium of quality of care. User-fee 
removal can only be counted as successful to the extent that users recognize a better option in 
the reformed service, comparing both quality and price variables. Consideration of utilization 
as an indicator of the effectiveness of policy reform measures the direct and desired outcome, 
improved access, but also indicates the extent of users’ preferences for the reformed service 
[59]. The observation that initial increases in utilization are not sustained (of our case studies, 
most likely in Zambia) implies that neither measure of success is long lived. Health workers 
make perhaps the most critical contribution to quality of care and to whether any utilization 
gains following fee removal are sustained. Interpersonal aspects of quality of care - whether 
users are treated with dignity and respect and given the attention their problem requires - 
always rank highly in studies of the attributes of quality that matter to users, and are mainly 
under the control of health workers. Health workers also have influence on whether drugs and 
other supplies are available when required: they can conceal available stocks, and can use 
initiative to replace drugs that are out of stock at the time, for example. Aggrieved health 
workers who do not support user-fee removal because they have not been adequately 
compensated for the lost income and increased workload, are least likely to support the 
maintenance of quality in any of its dimensions. 
Among the associated measures well-recognized in the existing literature is the need to 
ensure replacement of user-fee income where it is important at the local level. User-fee 
income has typically been used to provide bonuses to staff, employ additional contract staff 
and to support drug supply. All the case studies of user-fee removal or exemption except 
Nepal identified problems in either the failure to replace user-fee income or the inadequacy of 
the replacement in form or amount. 
Conclusions 
The interconnectedness between user-fee policy and HRH situations has proved too difficult 
to assess with the existing evidence base. Many policies have been changing over the relevant 
period, some have changed explicitly in response to problems associated with financing 
policy change, others might have responded, but policy documents do not make this clear in 
their explanation of the policy rationale. Other relevant variables have also changed and we 
do not have evidence that would allow a full understanding of the state of a country’s health 
system in the absence of user-fee policy changes. 
As is now well-recognized in the user-fee literature, coordination of health financing and HR 
policies is essential. This appears less well-recognized in the HR literature. In order to 
support (whole or partial) free health-care policies, investment needs to be made in pay and 
recruitment, and in particular to ensure that relative conditions of employment do not worsen 
for rural areas. Generalized pay increases in the context of an increasing imbalance of 
workloads in urban and rural areas may not be sufficient. Policy coordination proves an 
intractable problem in many settings, not only in low- and middle-income countries, but this 
does not mean that improvement is not possible within health policies, and across 
government and international stakeholders. 
Replacement of user-fee income is only part of the solution to the management of the 
introduction of free health care. Human resources need specific attention in relation to 
recruitment and retention, and most of all, distribution. Policies focusing on incentives to 
attract health staff to under-served areas are weak across all case studies. 
Demand-side financing approaches better replicate the positive aspects of the incentives 
embedded in user-fee systems, and appear to work well in Nepal. However, they may not 
work everywhere. They clearly can only work where reliable funding is maintained, as did 
not happen in Ghana. They may also require particular capacities of administrative systems, 
not always present, and it is noteworthy that the Nepal programme has been intensively 
supported with externally funded technical input, its management has not been integrated 
with general health system management and the challenge to achieve greater integration is 
now recognized. A careful analysis of the incentives embedded in alternative mechanisms of 
user-fee replacement is required everywhere for the most effective system in its context to be 
designed. 
Policies need effective monitoring systems that focus on the realities of their implementation 
as well as their impacts. At present, the data required to monitor effectively are insufficient, 
despite some recent efforts to invest in this area. 
Endnotes 
a[http://www.who.int/universal_health_coverage/en/]; 
b[http://www.icpdtaskforce.org/about/mission-vision.html]; 
cService Availability and Readiness Assessment: see [REFD]; 
d[http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/indbirthswithskilledhealthpersonnel/en/] (accessed 
15 March 2013); ethe narrow definition includes only midwives, doctors and clinical officers. 
The broad definition includes midwives, doctors, clinical offers and nurses weighted for the 
percentage of obstetric workload in the total facility workload; 
fThe World Health Report, 2005 (p91) suggests that for a district with a birth rate of 30/1000, 
one full-time-equivalent doctor is required for 3600 births. Gabrysch et al. (2011) translates 
this into 1200 births per doctor on the basis of three doctors required to provide 24-hour 
cover. The WHO Making Pregnancy Safer model specifies 1000 births per doctor, and we 
apply this lower number, which also seems to allow for professional development days, leave 
and sick leave; 
g
 PWT 7.0 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, 
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, May 2011. [http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt70/pwt70_form.php] 
(accessed 15 December 2011); 
h[http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD] (accessed 21 December 2011); 
i[http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD] (accessed 15 December 2011); 
jdetailed income distribution data are not available but these estimates are based on the 
extreme assumption that those earning the given ratio of salaries to average GDP/GNI per 
capita capture virtually the whole GNI/GDP. More realistic assumptions rank the salary 
earner more highly still, relative to the rest of the population. 
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